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KAYE SCHOLER-

OVERZEALOUS OR OVERBLOWN?

MONROE

H. FREEDMAN*

Kaye Scholer. The two words began as a metonymy for a prominent
and respected law firm' and have become a metaphor-a symbol for overzealous advocacy by lawyers who knowingly assist their clients in defrauding the public and obstructing justice.
Illustrative is a recent conference of the Association of American Law
Schools, where law professors who teach professional responsibility focused on the Kaye Scholer case. The unquestioned premise of the law
professors' discussion was that the Kaye Scholer lawyers were guilty of
seriously unethical conduct. The burden of the session, therefore, was what
law professors can do to guide their students away from the overzealousness and outright fraud represented by Kaye Scholer.2
And why should one not assume the worst about Kaye Scholer? After
all, the firm caved in without a struggle, paying the government
$41,000,000 to settle the case.'
The subtitle of this paper is "Overzealous or Overblown." And, in my
even-handed way, I will argue that the case represents both of these faults.
On the one hand, the government lawyers advanced overblown charges.
But, on the other hand, the government lawyers were overzealous in the
way they pursued those charges and abused the powers of their office.
To begin with, the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") regulators did
not say-as well they might-"We failed at our job." And they had indeed
failed. As one commentator observed last year:
*

Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics, Hofstra University. A.B.,

1951, LL.B., 1954, LL.M., 1956, Harvard University. Author,

UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETH-

ICS (Matthew Bender, 1990).'
1. The full name of the firm is Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler. The full name of
the case is United States of America before the, Office of Thrift Supervision, Department of the
Treasury In the Matter of Peter M. Fishbein, Karen E. Katzman, and Lynn Toby Fisher, Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, Former Outside Counsel of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, Irvine, California, Respondents, OTS AP-92-19 (Mar. 1, 1992).
2. Some of the professors seemed to be no less concerned with the evils of zealous advo-

cacy, but that is a subject for another time.
3. Amy Stevens & Paulette Thomas, Legal Crisis: How a Big Law Firm Was Brought to
Knees by Zealous Regulators-At Kaye Scholer, Survival Prevailed Over Principle as Partnership Panicked-Redefining a Lawyer's Duty, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at Al [hereinafter

Stevens & Thomas].
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To this day, the Office of Thrift Supervision is being run by the
same people and on the same philosophy that fostered the destruction
of the most efficient mortgage-producing system in the world.
...Chairman

[M. Danny] Wall promised to stop the undue def-

erence given the League of Savings Institutions. But, in fact, he allowed its lobbyists unprecedented access to him and placed a former
league employee (who later returned there) in the key position of director of economic policy.'
Instead of confronting their own failures as guardians of the public
interest, the regulators chose to ask the lawyers of Kaye Scholer, "Where
were you?" This question has been given currency by Federal District
Judge Stanley Sporkin's opinion in Lincoln Savings and Loan Association
v. Wall.5 Judge Sporkin asked (as it is frequently paraphrased): "Where
were the lawyers?" 6 His point was not that the lawyers had been in complicity with their client's wrongdoing. Rather, Judge Sporkin complained
that the private lawyers who represented the bankrupt thrift association had
failed to do the government's job of investigating and exposing their client.7
Let us be clear on that. As Judge Sporkin himself said in the same
opinion: "[Tihere is nothing in the record that would in any way suggest
counsel was acting in concert with [the client's] illicit activities." 8 The
problem, as Judge Sporkin saw it, was that the lawyers had not exercised
"due diligence" to assure that they had not been retained to "frustrate the
public interest."9 And, having ferreted out client conduct that is contrary to
the public interest, the private lawyers would then be required to "cooperate
with the public oversight regulators" in the prosecution of their own
clients. 10

This is not a new position for Stanley Sporkin." Indeed, I have heard
him boast, with justification, that the burgeoning attacks on members of the
bar by government regulators originated with his own tenure in the Enforce4. See Benjamin F. Dixon IV, Who's Really to Blame for the Thrift Crisis?, LEGAL

TIMES,

Mar. 22, 1993, at 29, 31.
5. 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990).
6. Id. at 919-20. The actual language was: "Where were these professionals ...?."Why
didn't any of them speak up ...
""Where also were the outside . . .attorneys when these
transactions were effectuated?" Id. at 920.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 921.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 920 & n.3.
11. But it is a selective position. When Judge Sporkin was General Counsel of the Central
Intelligence Agency, and could have blown the whistle on the Iran-Contra scandal, he facilitated
the cover-up and remained silent. Also, when Judge Sporkin's court was the subject of
whistleblowing, he took vigorous measures against it. See Monroe Freedman, So Where Was

Judge Stanley Sporkin?, LEGAL

TIMES,

Jan. 4, 1993,'at 23, 27.
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ment Division of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
"Commission"), where he was Director from 1973 to 1981. At that time,
the SEC found itself with a small staff, limited resources, and a heavy burden of securities enforcement. Accordingly, the Commission took the position that "the task of enforcing the securities laws rests in overwhelming
measure on the bar's shoulders.""2
For anyone who believes in the importance of limited government and
an independent private bar, that is a radical and shocking proposition. 3 If
the SEC, the OTS, or any other regulatory agency, lacks the resources to do
its job adequately, the proper way to deal with the problem is to persuade
the Congress to provide adequate funds. Instead, the SEC chose to dragoon
the private bar into government service (and without benefit of civil service
status).
As described by an SEC chairman, private lawyers were pressured to
do the government's job by means of "overly crude" weapons. 4 That is,
lawyers were intimidated by "suitable incentives"-a system of "rewards"
and "punishments." 15 The punishments included threats to prosecute, disbar, or suspend lawyers who were zealous in representing their clients. 6
As a result of these tactics, one commissioner publicly questioned
whether the lawyer was becoming just "another cop on the beat." 17 And he
added that "all the old verities and truisms about attorneys and their roles
are in question and in jeopardy .... "1 8
That is, the traditional role-the constitutional role-of the lawyer is
to stand between the client and the government. But to the regulatory agencies, this has become not a noble tradition, but a ground for harsh criticism
and heavy sanctions. Thus, part of the government's Notice of Charges
against Kaye Scholer is that the firm "interposed" itself between its client,
Lincoln Savings and Loan, and the regulatory agency.' 9
As explained by Brendan Sullivan, representing Oliver North before a
Senate committee, that is the lawyer's job. "I'm not a potted plant," Sulli12. In re Emanuel Fields, Securities Act Release No. 33-5404, 2 S.E.C. Docket 1, 1973 WL
18519, at *7 n.20 (June 18, 1973).
13. See Monroe H. Freedman, A Civil LibertarianLooks at Securities Regulation, 35 OHio
ST. L.J. 280 (1974). Judge Sporkin and I debated these issues in Monroe H. Freedman & Stanley
Sporkin, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Enforcement Program: A Debate on the
Enforcement Process, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781 (1981).
14. Ray Garrett, Jr., New Directions in Professional Responsibility, Address Before the
American Bar Association, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 11, 1973) in Bus. LAW., Mar. 1974, at 7.
15. Id. at 12-13.
16. Id. at 11.
17. A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] Fed.- Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,631, at 83,690 (Jan. 23, 1974).
18. Id. at 83,689.
19. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, 45 (Mar. 1, 1992).
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van explained when told not to object to questions put to his client. "I'm
here as the lawyer. That's my job."2 The committee, of course, was acting
in the highest public interest by trying to get at the truth of the Iran-Contra
scandal. And Sullivan was also acting in the highest public interest by zealously representing the interests of his client, interposing himself between
his client and the committee.
Justice Lewis Powell made the same point as Brendan Sullivan, less
pungently perhaps, but in more measured terms:
[T]he duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as an "officer of the
court," is to further the interests of his clients by all lawful means,
even when those interest are in conflict with the interests of the
United States or of a State. But this representation involves no conflict of interest in the invidious sense. Rather, it casts the lawyer in
his honored and traditional role as an authorized but independent
agent acting to vindicate the legal rights of a client, whoever it may
be.21

Eight years later, writing for a majority of eight, Justice Powell sharpened the point: "[A] defense lawyer best serves the public, not by acting on
behalf of the State or in concert with it, but rather by advancing the 'undivided interests of his client.' "22
Just so. Kaye Scholer, hired as litigation counsel by a client who had
been targeted by the government, did its job-not by acting in concert with
the government, but by representing the undivided interests of its client. In
a free society, that is one of the most important ways that lawyers serve the
public interest.
Kaye Scholer's punishment for doing so was severe. Its assets were
frozen for an indefinite period, and the firm was forbidden to transfer its
20.

Sullivan's words have been immortalized in

FRED

R.

SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTION-

271 (1993).
21. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724 n.14 (1973). Justice Powell further asserts that:
It has been stated many times that lawyers are 'officers of the court.' One of the
most frequently repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333, 378 [18 L. Ed. 366]. The Court pointed out there, however, that an attorney was
not an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term. Certainly nothing that was
said in Ex parte Garlandor in any other case decided by this Court places attorneys in
the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a
lawyer is engaged in a private profession, important though it be to our system of justice.In general he makes his own decisions, follows his own best judgement, collects
his own fees and runs his own business. The word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers conveys quite a different meaning from the word "officer" as applied to
people serving as officers within the conventional meaning of that term."
Id. at 728-29 (quoting Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956)); cf. id. at 731-32
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting the importance to our legal system for lawyers to remain independent from the government on the one hand and client on the other).
22. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981).
ARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS
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assets without the approval of the OTS.23 One-fourth of the earnings of all
partners were sequestered, as was an even higher proportion of the earnings
of two partners. Three partners were forbidden to sell or to encumber their
personal property in excess of $5,000. As a result of these heavy sanctions,
banks closed down the firm's line of credit, and Kaye Scholer faced
dissolution.2 4
These penalties were unprecedentedly harsh-a virtual death sentence
for the firm. They were also imposed without notice, without hearing, and
without any other due process. In addition, the government sought
$275 000,000.25 To the government's advantage, the case was to be litigated before an administrative law judge, not an Article III federal district
judge.
Moreover, these severe sanctions were accompanied by charges of unlawful and unethical conduct 2 6 -charges that were never adjudicated but
which were widely believed. As noted above, even a group of sophisticated
law professors, specializing in lawyers' professional responsibilities, assumed without question that the Kaye Scholer lawyers were guilty in fact of
the overzealousness, fraud, and obstruction of justice with which they had
been charged.
Under these overwhelming pressures, Kaye Scholer quickly agreed to
a negotiated settlement with the OTS.2 7 But responsible people who looked
more closely at the underlying facts came out on the side of Kaye Scholer.
The American Bar Association ("ABA") appointed a select Working
Group on Lawyers' Representation of Regulated Clients. This group studied the Kaye Scholer matter and issued a report that was then unanimously
approved by the ABA's House of Delegates. The report found that the OTS
charges were based on standards of lawyer conduct that appeared to go
beyond or to conflict with traditional principles of professional responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. And it concluded (as
argued here) that the OTS's novel positions on ethical standards were an
inappropriate attempt to make lawyers representing regulated companies
into agents of the government, contrary to their traditional ethical obligations of loyalty to the client.
In addition, the most serious charges against Kaye Scholer were investigated for a year, sua sponte, by Hal Lieberman, Chief Counsel of the New
York State Departmental Disciplinary Committee that oversees the ethics of
23.
24.
25.

Stevens & Thomas, supra note 3, at Al.
Stevens & Thomas, supra note 3, at Al.
Stevens & Thomas, supra note 3, at Al.

26. In re Fishbein, OTS AP-92-19, 4th Claim (Mar. 1, 1992).
27.

Stevens & Thomas, supra note 3, at Al; see also infra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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lawyers in New York City.28 Lieberman's investigation included interviews with a large number of current and former Kaye Scholer lawyers,
with officials of Arthur Andersen (which had resigned as accountants for
the firm at a critical point), with the OTS and SEC officials, and with several Assistant United States Attorneys in Los Angeles. In addition, he reviewed thousands of pages of documents, including the OTS files and
internal Kaye Scholer memoranda that had at one time been privileged and
confidential.
Lieberman recognized that no lawyer is permitted to counsel a client
to, or assist a client in, unlawfully withholding information or otherwise
violating federal disclosure requirements.29 But he found no substantial evidence that this had occurred, and no basis for taking any disciplinary
action.3 °
The most impressive evidence of the overzealousness of OTS lawyers,
however, was in the outcome of the case. The OTS had charged that Kaye
Scholer had been responsible for a loss of $275,000,000, which the OTS
sought to recover. 3 ' Then, with the law firm virtually broken by the asset
freeze and at the mercy of the OTS, the agency settled for $41,000,000-a
mere 15% of the harm for which it claimed Kaye Scholer had been
responsible.32
Which leaves the question: If the OTS really had a case against Kaye
Scholer for $275,000,000, and had the advantage of litigating the case
before an administrative law judge, why did the OTS cave in and settle for a
paltry 15% of that amount?
During the South Texas symposium, I posed that question publicly as a
challenge to Harris Weinstein, who had been Chief Counsel for the OTS
during the attack on Kaye Scholer. Mr. Weinstein chose not to answer it in
his remarks at the symposium.
So here is my answer. The OTS caved in because its charges were
unjustified and would not have stood up in administrative proceedings or in
the judicial review that would have followed. Moreover, the asset freeze,
without notice or hearing, was a violation of due process. And the words
"Kaye Scholer" should not be a metaphor for overzealous lawyering by the
28.

I know Mr. Lieberman to be an intelligent and conscientious disciplinary counsel of

integrity.
29. Lieberman's conclusions were in the form of a letter to Kaye Scholer lawyer Peter M.
Fishbein. Letter from Hal Lieberman, Chief Counsel of the New York State Departmental Disciplinary Committee, to Peter M. Fishbein (Aug. 9, 1994), published as Re: Sua Sponte Investigation, Docket No. 0990/92, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 3, 1994, at 10.

30.

Id.

31.
32.

Stevens & Thomas, supra note 3, at Al.
Stevens & Thomas, supra note 3, at Al.
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private bar. Rather, it should stand for the abuse of governmental powers
by overzealous public lawyers intent upon shifting onto others the blame for
their own agency's regulatory failures.

